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SELLERS v. QUALLS
The Presumption Of Undue Influence Arising From A
Confidential Relation Between A Testator And
Beneficiary In A Will Contest
Sellers v. Qualls'
The caveators of the will were three brothers, a sister,
and the daughter of a deceased sister of the testatrix. The
proponents were the Rev. Qualls, who was the executor
named in the will, and the Bethel Church, of which Qualls
was pastor. By her will, the testatrix devised her home
property to the Bethel Church and the residue of her estate
to her "heirs at law".2 There were two issues contested -
mental capacity and undue influence. At the conclusion
of the case, the trial court directed a verdict sustaining the
validity of the will, which was affirmed on appeal.
On the issue of undue influence, evidence had been pre-
sented to show that the testatrix was a devoted member of
the church. She was frequently visited by the Rev. Qualls,
and customarily he spoke with her alone. After such visits
she seemed quite nervous and upset. It was also discovered
that the testatrix had loaned Quails two thousand dollars
on quite liberal terms, and entrusted a large part of her
business affairs to him. The day following a private conver-
sation between them which lasted approximately two hours,
Qualls, or his wife, brought the testatrix to the Quall's
home, where the will was drawn by a lawyer, selected by
Qualls. The only other party present was Martin, a deacon
of the church, who along with the attorney acted as witness
of the execution of the will.
On appeal, Judge Brune opened his opinion by quoting
the definition of "undue influence" stated in Grove v.
Spiker8:
".... that degree of importunity which deprives the
testator of his free agency, which is such that he is too
weak to resist, and will render the instrument not his
free and unconstrained act."'
The Court held, that the evidence presented constituted
sufficient proof that a confidential relation existed between
the testatrix and Qualls and considered such a relationship
a relevant fact which could be considered along with other
2206 Md. 58, 110 A. 2d 73 (1954).
The record does not disclose the value of the property devised 'to the
Bethel Church nor that of the residue; however it appears that the former
was of greater value than the latter.
872 Md. 300, 301, 20 A. 144 (1890).
'Supra, n. 1, 70.
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pertinent facts in determining whether there was undue
influence in connection with the devise. However, the
Court firmly stated that the doctrine of equitable con-
fidential relations, which concerns those transactions
classified as inter vivos in which there arises a presumption
of undue influence upon proof of the mere existence of a
confidential relation alone,5 does not extend to testamentary
gifts in this state.
An inter vivos gift is one that is made and perfected dur-
ing the lifetimes of the donor and donee,6 while a testa-
mentary gift is a disposition of property which is not to take
effect until the grantor dies.' When a gift is made under
circumstances satisfying the requirements which establish
an inter vivos transaction, and there is the existence of a
confidential relation between the donor and donee, the
burden of going ahead with the evidence shifts, from the
party contesting its validity, to the donee, making the latter
prove the non-existence of undue influence.8 However it is
generally accepted as the prevailing view in this country
that where a will is duly executed by one of a sound mind,
the burden of proving undue influence is upon the one who
is contesting the will, notwithstanding the existence of a
confidential relation between the testator and beneficiary.9
The philosophy underlying the rule has been most appro-
priately stated:
"'In the maze born of incrimination so common to
struggles over the leavings of the dead, we must be ever
mindful that our duty to the departed is to maintain
their solemnly authenticated testament, and not suffer
it to be defeated unless vitiated by the super-imposed
will of another.' The burden of proof of undue influ-
ence is upon him who asserts it. Mere existence of a
confidential relationship between testator and benefi-
ciary does not create a presumption of undue influence,
but some additional evidence . . .must be proved in
order to impose upon the beneficiary the burden of
going forward with the evidence."'"
As stated in the above quotation, the burden of going for-
ward with the evidence will shift to the proponent where,
Cook v. Hollyday, 185 Md. 656, 45 A. 2d 761 (1946).
Neal v. Neal, 194 Ark. 226, 106 S. W. 2d 595, 600 (1937).
7Diefendorf v. Diefendorf, 56 Hun. (N. Y.) 639, 8 N. Y. S. 617 (1890).
Patch v. Squires, 105 Vt. 405, 165 A. 919, 921 (1933).8 Merryman v. Euler, 59 Md. 588 (1883).
0 94 C. J. S. Wills 1085, See. 237.
10 Hazelwood and Thompson, Attorney and client: Presumption of undue
influence: Attorney as testamentary beneficiary, 31 Cor. L. Q. 80, 84 (1945).
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in addition to the confidential relation, evidence is pre-
sented to show some suspicious circumstance arising from
the maneuvering of the beneficiary as the dominant party
in his association with the testator." Therefore, the weight
of authority recognizes the application of the doctrine of
equitable confidential relations to testamentary dispositions
in certain situations, and in such situations treats the prob-
lem in the same manner as it is treated where the one bene-
fiting from an inter vivos gift was in a confidential relation
with the donor. 2 These situations usually involve a bequest
or devise1 3 to a confidant who actively participated14 in the
preparation or execution of the will; 5 that is, one who
initiated the proceedings, employed the draftsman, selected
the witnesses, excluded persons from the presence of the
testator at the time of the making of the will, or concealed
the will after it had been made.'"
Where the court has shifted the burden to the proponent
to prove the absence of undue influence, it is usually held
that proof that the testator was the possessor of a sound
mind, not particularly susceptible to the pressures being
exerted upon him by those within his confidence, and that
the will was his clear desire is sufficient to overcome the
burden thus cast upon him. 7 However, some courts, being
more strict, require evidence that proves that at the time of
the execution of the will the testator had the independent
advice of a reputable attorney.'"
u Jones v. Roberts, 37 Mo. App. 163 (1889).
57 Am. Jur. 277, Wills, Sec. 386; In Re Hull's Estate, 63 Cal. App. 2d
135, 146 P. 2d 242 (1944).
Sulzberger v. Sulzberger, 372 Ill. 240, 23 N. E. 2d 46 (1939). An undue
disposition is one in which a party benefits from a will made through his
agency in the absence of others having equal or greater claim to the
testator's bounty. In Re Bottler's Estate, 106 N. J. Eq. 226, 150 A. 786
(1930) ; Appeal of Livingston's, 63 Conn. 68, 26 A. 470 (1893). It is essential
to the raising of a presumption that evidence be presented that proves that
the allegedly active party was directly benefited by the will. If he be
merely an executor named under the will, with no other interest directly
or indirectly, a draftsman, or a lawyer who drew the will and named one
of the executors without bond, the burden will not be shifted. However,
cf. Little v. Sugg, 243 Ala. 196, 8 So. 2d 866 (1942), where it was held
that the presumption will arise from the activity of a confidant of the testa-
tor, who, although not direc.tly benefiting, exerted his influence for the
benefit of his mother.
"liZeigler v. Coffin, 219 Ala. 586, 123 So. 22 (1929). The activities, in all
respects, must be directly connected with the execution of the will and must
be beyond the mere compliance with, or obedience to, the testator's volun-
tary instructions.
sIn re Baird's Estate, 176 Cal. 381, 168 P. 561 (1917).
16 Bancroft v. Otis, 91 Ala. 279, 289, 8 So. 286 (1890).
17 In re Bryan's Estate, 82 Utah 390, 25 P. 2d 602 (1933).
Is In re Teller's Estate, 288 Mich. 193, 284 N. W. 696 (1939).
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The rule in Maryland refusing to raise a presumption of
undue influence in a will contest, where the testator and
beneficiary were in a confidential relation, stems from the
early English case of Parfitt v. Lawless' through an opinion
handed down by Lord Penzance, which involved a will
devising an entire estate to a catholic priest, the confessor
of the testatrix. It was there expressed:
"In cases of gifts or other transactions inter vivos,
it's considered by the courts of equity, that the natural
influence which such relations as those in question in-
volve, exerted by those who possess it, to obtain a
benefit for themselves, is undue influence. The law re-
garding wills is very different from this. The natural
influence of parent or guardian over the child, husband
over wife, and attorney over the client may lawfully
be exerted to obtain a will or legacy as long as the tes-
tator thoroughly understands what he is doing, and is
a free agent."2
The Maryland courts first dealt with this problem in
1862 in the case of Tyson v. Tyson,21 a will contest in which
a child of the testator was the principal beneficiary. It was
there held that the doctrine of confidential relations, as
recognized in the courts of equity involving inter vivos
transactions, does not extend to a devise or bequest from a
parent to a child. The Court of Appeals held that in such a
situation the burden was upon the caveator. It was rea-
soned that in inter vivos situations the benefited party par-
ticipates; and calling upon him to explain his connection
therewith, and the circumstances in which his interests
were entangled, would be no hardship since he would only
be required to make an explanation within his knowledge.
This cannot hold true in a will contest where it is quite
usual that the devisee has no knowledge of the testa-
mentary act. To cast upon the devisee the burden of show-
ing under the circumstances the will was made would place
upon him a burden which, in many cases, he could not possi-
bly discharge. It was recognized by the Court in the Tyson
case that in some jurisdictions the doctrine of confidential
relations has been extended to bequests under will where
the relationship between the testator and beneficiary was
that of attorney and client or guardian and ward. The ques-
tion, however, of whether the extension was recognized in
'L. R. 2 P. & D. 462 (1872).
Ibi d, 469.37 Md. 567 (1873).
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Maryland, was left unanswered, the Court feeling that it
was qualified only to decide upon the facts there presented
which involved a disposition from a parent to a child.
In 1879 the question was answered in Griffith v. Dif-
fenderffer.2 2 The Court ruled that the fact that the bene-
ficiary actively participated in its execution or preparation
is nothing more than a suspicious circumstance to be con-
sidered by the jury in determining its finding of whether
or not there was undue influence.2" In Stirling v. Stirling,24
the Court even more explicitly held that in a situation
where the draftsman is the principal beneficiary, it is not
within the province of the court to stigmatize that as a
suspicious circumstance, but it is a question upon which
reasonable minds could differ and, therefore, a question
for the jury to decide. The Court again looked to the rule of
the Diffenderffer case in Cook v. Hollyday,25 where it was
pointed out that the suspicious circumstance depended
upon the facts connected therewith and not upon the char-
acter of the relationship. The dissent in Snyder v. Cear-
foss2" again repudiated the raising of a presumption of un-
due influence where the principal beneficiary was the attor-
ney who drew the will, when it declared that the presump-
tion of invalidity was inapplicable to such a situation. Such
a fact gives rise only to a suspicious circumstance and not
to a presumption that the will is invalid.
The Maryland cases have consistently distinguished the
case of testamentary gifts from inter vivos ones and have
held equally as often that the doctrine of equitable con-
fidential relations, which is recognized in the case of inter
vivos gifts, has no application where the gift is made by a
testamentary act.27 It is within the area where there is
proven the existence of suspicious circumstances that the
Maryland Court is not in accord with weight of authority.
As previously stated, in Maryland no evidence whatever,
- 50 Md. 466 (1879).
Ibid. Ruling on the question of the existence of a confidential relation
between the testator and beneficiary, the Court at page 4&3 said:
"But there is an obvious difference between a gift, whereby the donor
strips himself of the enjoyment of his property whilst living, and a gift
by will, which takes effect only from the death of the testator."
Further, on page 484, the Court continued:
"The fact that a party is largely benefited by a will prepared by him-
self, or in the preparation of which he takes an active part, is nothing
more than a suspicious circumstance, of more or less weight according
to the facts of each particular case."
64 Md. 138, 146-7, 21 A. 273 (1885).
185 Md. 656, 45A. 2d 761 (1946).
- 187 Md. 635, dis. op. 644, 51 A. 2d 264 (1947).
Koppal v. Soules, 189 Md. 346, 58 A. 2d 48 (1947).
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no matter to what extent it shows the participation by the
beneficiary in the will's execution, will warrant the shift-
ing of the burden of going forward with the evidence to the
proponent of the will.2" However, upon a close examination
of the Maryland cases, and particularly the instant case it
is apparent that the Court quite often arrives at the same
conclusion as would one that adheres to the view followed
by the weight of authority. For example, the jury in the
instant case found that the evidence presented proved that
the testatrix was of sound mind, free from the alleged pres-
sures being exerted upon her.29 Such evidence probably
would have been sufficient to overcome the burden that
would have shifted to the proponent had the case come
before a court which follows the opposite view.30
The purpose of the majority rule seems to be an attempt
to arrive more propitiously at a fair and just conclusion. It
should be pointed out that the essential elements that must
necessarily be present to shift the burden in the juris-
dictions following the majority rule are: (1) that a con-
fidential relation exists; (2) that the beneficiary is the
dominant party in the relationship, and (3) that he actively
participated in either the preparation or the execution of
the will." It is readily noticed that in the cases where these
elements are present the caveator is not in a position to
prove the very act that constituted the undue influence
since he was an outsider to the relation, but there is enough
evidence presented to show that but for some influence
exerted by the beneficiary the will might have been made
in the contestant's favor. Therefore, by a rational con-
clusion, the burden of going ahead with the evidence should
be cast upon the proponent to prove that the influence that
might have been exerted by him was not of the type classi-
fied by the courts as undue. A review of the basis of the
Maryland rule has left upon the writer the impression that
it was not originally intended to apply to this situation. It
is stated by the Court in the Tyson" Case that it is quite
2
s Ibid.
2 Evidence was presented which proved that Qualls on several occasions
had tried to exchange his house for hers which was of much greater value.
On all of these occasions the testatrix would not succumb to the pressures
being exerted upon her. Sellers v. Qualls, 206 Md. 58, 70 et seq., 110 A. 2d
73 (1954).
3 In re Nelson's Estate, 134 Cal. App. 561, 25 P. 2d 871 (1933).
81 In re ,Kirby's Appeal, 91 Conn. 40, 98 A. 349 (1916).
=37 Md. 567 (1873). It was also stated by the Court, at page 583, that
the justification of the application of the equitable doctrine of confidential
relations to inter vivo8 gifts rests upon the fact that the beneficiary usually
participates, and in calling upon him to explain his connection therewith
and the circumstances in which his interests were entangled, would be no
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usual that the devisee has no knowledge of the testa-
mentary act, and to cast upon him the burden of showing
under what circumstances the will was made would place
upon him a burden he could not possibly discharge. This
reasoning is quite in accord with the prevailing view,33 for
it seems concerned only with a situation lacking the ele-
ments necessary to constitute a suspicious circumstance. 4
Thus the creation of a rule which would shift the burden of
going forward with the evidence to the proponent of the
will, when evidence is presented which sufficiently reveals
the existence of suspicious circumstances, would in no way
be a deviation from the basic rule which distinguishes testa-
mentary gifts from the doctrine of equitable confidential
relations as applicable to inter vivos gifts.
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Torts - Charitable Immunity As A Screen
To Insurer's Liability
Gorman v. St. Paul Fire Ins. Co.'
The plaintiff's wife, while a patient in Suburban Hos-
pital in Montgomery County, was injured through the
negligence of a nurse. The plaintiff brought an action
against the Hospital alleging the above facts and claiming
$150,000.00 damages. The hospital filed a general issue plea
and a special plea that it was an eleemosynary institution
and hence immune from liability. Thereupon, the plaintiff
brought suit against the insurance company, alleging that
the Hospital was insured in the amount of $100,000.00
against liability for negligence. The policy was required
by statute to contain a provision to the effect that the in-
surer shall be estopped from asserting the defense of the
insured that it is immune from liability on the ground that
hardship since he would only be required to make an explanation within
his knowledge. Such reasoning could easily be extended to a situation in
which the beneficiary of a will had actively participated in the making of
testamentary disposition. In this instance also the proponent would only
be made to explain that which was within his knowledge.
94 C. J. S. Wills 1085, Sec. 237.
In re'Kirby's Appeal, 8upra, n. 31.
a' See also, the more recent case of Murray v. Fearing, Daily Record,
April 20, 1956 (Circuit Court of Baltimore City), which relied upon the
principal case and quoted it at length.
- 210 Md. 1, 121 A. 2d 812 (1956).
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